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Introduction
The General Scheme of  the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 was approved fordrafting by the Irish government on the 3 October 2017. When published, most media
outlets focused on the Minister for Health’s announcement concerning state funding for in
vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment, with little commentary on the substantive provisions of
the Bill.1 This is perhaps surprising given that this Bill has been ‘imminent’ since February
20152 and has been eagerly awaited by all stakeholders for some years. The Bill proposes to
further regulate the area of  assisted human reproduction (AHR), essentially filling in the
gaps of  the regulation created (but not yet commenced) by the Children and Family
Relationships Act 2015. The Bill provides for:
1 the regulation of  assisted human reproduction;
2 gamete and embryo donation for use in assisted human reproduction
treatment and research;
3 posthumous assisted reproduction involving the gametes or embryos of  a
deceased person under certain conditions;
4 pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and sex selection;
5 surrogacy;
6 embryo and stem cell research; and 
7 the creation of  a new Assisted Human Reproduction Regulatory Authority. 
This article examines the proposals for surrogacy that are set out in the General Scheme.
It argues that these proposals are unnecessarily complicated and that the delayed model
of  parentage that is proposed would not be an adequate approach to regulation in
Ireland. It is argued that Ireland should instead adopt a pre-conception model of
parentage in surrogacy in order to better protect the interests of  all those involved in the
surrogacy process. 
1     S Bardon, ‘Government to Pay for Couples to have IVF Treatment’ Irish Times (Dublin, 3 October 2017);
‘Cabinet Approves Legislation for IVF Financial Aid’ RTENews.ie (3 October 2017)
<www.rte.ie/news/2017/1003/909224-cabinet_maternity/>.
2     Department of  Health, ‘Govt to Legislate for Assisted Human Reproduction and Associated Research (Press
release, Department of  Health 25 February 2015) <http://health.gov.ie/blog/press-release/govt-to-legislate-
for-assisted-human-reproduction-associated-research>.
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Surrogacy in Ireland
Surrogacy is a process whereby a person agrees to carry a child on behalf  of  another
person or couple. It is a process that raises complex legal, ethical and moral
considerations about a range of  issues such as the potential commodification of  children;
the psychological development of  children born through surrogacy; and the perceived
exploitation of  women who act as surrogates. There is no consensus on these questions
and as a result countries adopt varying approaches to the regulation of  surrogacy. In some
countries, surrogacy is permitted and fully regulated,3 in other jurisdictions surrogacy is
legal but there is no regulation,4 while in other countries surrogacy is prohibited
completely.5 Ireland currently falls into the middle category: tolerant but (arguably) not
accommodating (due to the lack of  regulation). The absence of  legislation to specifically
address surrogacy gives rise to a plethora of  difficulties, principally because the absence
of  legislation does not mean an absence of  surrogacy. Each year, more and more children
are born through surrogacy to Irish intended parents, both at home and abroad. They are
born, to use the words of  O’Donnell J in MR and An tArd Chláraitheoir, ‘into a legal half
world’ where their status is ‘determined by happenstance’.6
The absence of  specific legislation to regulate surrogacy creates a number of
difficulties. Without specific legislation, parentage is determined by recourse to the same
rules that apply in ‘natural’ conception: the woman who gives birth to the child is always
regarded as the child’s legal mother; if  she is married to a man, her husband is presumed
to be the legal father; and if  she is not married (or if  the presumption in favour of  the
husband is rebutted), the genetic father is recognised as the legal father. Therefore, in
cases of  surrogacy, the surrogate is always recognised as the legal mother,7 and the genetic
father typically is recognised as the legal father. This means that an intended mother
(genetically related to the child or not), or an intended father who is not genetically related
to the child, are not recognised as legal parents upon the birth of  the child. They are left
to rely on guardianship or adoption as their only options to acquire any legal connection
to the child that they will likely raise from birth.8
Proposals for regulation
Ireland has committed itself  to introducing legislation to regulate surrogacy and surrogacy
legislation has been discussed for many years. As far back as 2005, the Commission on
Assisted Human Reproduction recommended by a majority that legislation should be
introduced to regulate surrogacy and that the intended parents should be presumed to be
the legal parents of  any child born through surrogacy.9 In January 2014, the Irish
government included proposals to regulate surrogacy in the Children and Family
3     For example, in California, surrogacy is regulated under the Uniform Parentage Act and Assembly Bill No
1217. 
4     In Ireland, for example, surrogacy is legal but there is no specific regulation. 
5     In Italy, for example, surrogacy is prohibited under Law No 40 of  19 February 2004 (the Medically Assisted
Reproduction Act). This prohibition and its effects were considered by the European Court of  Human Rights
in Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy, App No 25358/12, 24 January 2017. See: L Bracken, ‘Assessing the Best
Interests of  the Child in Cases of  Cross-border Surrogacy: Inconsistency in the Strasbourg approach?’ (2017)
39 Journal of  Social Welfare and Family Law 368. 
6     MR and An tArd Chláraitheoir [2014] IESC 60; [2014] 3 IR 533, [211]. 
7     Ibid. 
8     For discussion of  the unsuitability of  guardianship and adoption in this context, see: L Bracken, ‘The Role of
the Best Interests Principle in Regulating Parentage in Surrogacy in Ireland’ [2017] International Family Law
115. 
9     Report of  the Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction (Dublin 2005).
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Relationships Bill 2014. In essence, the 2014 Bill made provision for a ‘delayed’ or ‘post-
birth’ model of  parentage whereby the surrogate would be recognised as the legal mother
upon the birth of  the child10 and the intended parents could subsequently apply for a
declaration of  parentage to extinguish the surrogate’s parental status and to acquire parental
responsibilities and rights for themselves.11 The surrogate’s consent would be required
before this declaration could be made12 and the application for the declaration could be
sought not less than 30 days after and not more than six months after the child’s birth.13
The surrogacy proposals were subsequently removed from the 2014 Bill, as it was felt
that further policy work and consultations were required in relation to surrogacy. As such,
the regulation of  surrogacy was deferred to the recently published Assisted Reproduction
Bill 2017. The new General Scheme proposes to introduce a comprehensive framework
for the regulation of  surrogacy in Ireland. The model of  parentage that is proposed is
broadly similar to that put forward in the 2014 Bill, but there are some notable
differences. For example, the 2017 Bill requires that all surrogacy agreements be pre-
authorised by a new Assisted Human Reproduction Regulatory Authority, which had not
previously been proposed. The main elements of  the proposed regulation of  surrogacy
are set out below.
Head 36 of  the General Scheme establishes a number of  conditions that have to be
met for surrogacy to be permitted. This Head establishes a fairly restrictive model of
surrogacy as it only permits specific types of  surrogacy arrangements. It establishes that
the surrogacy must be domestic, gestational and non-commercial. This means that the
proposed regulation will not apply in situations where international or cross-border
surrogacy is used and so intended parents who have embarked on surrogacy abroad
would not be able to rely on the provisions in the General Scheme to establish their
parentage upon return to Ireland. The surrogacy must also be gestational which means
that the surrogate must not be genetically related to the child. Thus, ‘traditional’
surrogacy, where the surrogate provides her egg to enable the conception of  the child, is
not permitted. Commercial surrogacy is also prohibited meaning that the surrogate
cannot be offered or given any payment or other reward for her involvement in the
process.14 ‘Reasonable expenses’ are, however, allowed. Reasonable expenses are defined
in Head 41 of  the General Scheme to include medical expenses, travel expenses, loss of
earnings, and legal advice among other things. In fact, it would seem that the surrogate
would have the right to demand payment of  such expenses as the General Scheme
specifically states that a surrogacy agreement is not an enforceable contract, except in
relation to the payment of  the surrogate’s reasonable expenses.15
In order to avail of  the regulation proposed by the General Scheme, the surrogate and
intended parents must also meet specific criteria. The surrogate must: be habitually
resident in Ireland; have previously given birth to a child; be least 25 years of  age but
under 47 years of  age; and must have been assessed and approved as suitable to act as a
surrogate by a registered medical practitioner and also by a counsellor.16 The intending
parent(s) must be at least 21 years of  age and at least one of  them must: be under 47 years
of  age; be habitually resident in Ireland; and have contributed a gamete to the child’s
10   General Scheme of  the Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014, Head 12(1). 
11   Ibid Head 13
12   The surrogate’s consent would be required unless she is deceased or cannot be located: ibid Head 13(9)(b). 
13   Ibid Head 13(5). 
14   Ibid Head 40.
15   Ibid Head 41.
16   Ibid Head 38. 
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conception. Where there is only one intended parent, one of  the following conditions
must apply: he or she must be unable to gestate a pregnancy; unable to conceive a child
for medical reasons; unlikely to survive a pregnancy or giving birth; or likely to have her
health significantly affected by a pregnancy or by giving birth. Where there are two
intended parents, together as a couple they must either be: unable to gestate a pregnancy;
unable to conceive a child for medical reasons; include a woman who is unlikely to survive
a pregnancy or giving birth; or include a woman who is likely to have her health
significantly affected by a pregnancy or by giving birth.17
The Bill also requires that the surrogate and intending parent(s) undergo counselling
and receive independent legal advice at each stage of  the surrogacy agreement.18 The
stages referred to are: (i) before the agreement; (ii) after the birth of  the child but before
the child is living with the intending parents; and (iii) at the time of  the application for
the transfer of  parentage of  the child.19 In addition, the General Scheme provides that
the personal details of  each intending parent, the surrogate, donor (where applicable) and
any child born under the surrogacy agreement must be recorded in the National
Surrogacy Register.20
The model of  parentage established under the 2017 Bill is broadly similar to that
which had been put forward in the 2014 Bill. It is a ‘delayed’ model of  parentage whereby
the surrogate will be recognised as the legal mother on the birth of  the child (and if  she
is married to a man, her husband is recognised as the legal father). The intending parents
may not automatically have any legal connection to the child at birth. The General
Scheme provides that following the birth of  the child, the surrogate is required to provide
her consent to the child living with the intending parent(s).21 Thereafter, the intending
parent(s) (or the surrogate) can apply to the court for a parental order to transfer
parentage from the surrogate to the intending parent(s). This application cannot be made
earlier than six weeks and not more than six months after the child’s birth,22 and the
consent of  the surrogate (and her husband, if  she has one) is required before the parental
order can be granted. This requirement can be waived in certain circumstances, such as
where the surrogate is deceased or cannot be located.23
A notable difference between the 2017 Bill and the earlier proposals to regulate
surrogacy is the requirement for pre-authorisation of  the surrogacy agreement. An AHR
treatment provider is required to apply to the Regulatory Authority and receive written
authorisation for a surrogacy agreement before any treatment can be provided under that
agreement.24 The Regulatory Authority will only provide authorisation if  the agreement
meets all of  the conditions set out in Head 36 of  the Bill and if  the agreement has been
signed by the surrogate, and each intending parent. Once the authorisation is issued, it is
only valid for the period specified in the authorisation, up to a maximum period of  two
years. The pre-authorisation of  the surrogacy agreement does not determine the
allocation of  parentage in any way. It simply ensures that all of  the conditions set out
above are adhered to before the conception of  the child takes place. After the birth of
17   Ibid Head 39.
18   Ibid Head 43.
19   Explanatory Note accompanying Ibid Head 43. 
20   Ibid Ibid Head 36.
21   Ibid.
22   Ibid Head 47.
23   Ibid Head 48.
24   Ibid Head 37.
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the child, the intended parents will still need to make an application to the court for a
parental order to transfer parentage to them.
The time limits proposed in the General Scheme for the parental order application
also differ significantly from those proposed in the 2014 Bill. Under the 2014 proposals,
the application to transfer parentage could not be sought less than 30 days after and not
more than six months after the child’s birth.25 By contrast, the General Scheme proposes
that the application for the parental order could not be made earlier than six weeks and not
more than six months after the child’s birth.26 The Explanatory Note accompanying the
General Scheme explains that this longer waiting period is designed ‘to allow the
surrogate sufficient time to recover from the rigours of  pregnancy and childbirth before
participating in proceedings’.27 The surrogate’s consent is required for the parental order
to be granted and so the rationale behind the waiting period is that she must be in full
health before consenting to the transfer of  parentage. 
The rationale for the delay in the transfer of  parentage might seem a sensible
approach, but a significant difficulty with any sort of  time limit for the transfer of
parentage is that the chid will be in the care of  the intending parents from birth.28 As was
noted above, at the time of  the child’s birth, at least one of  the intended parents will not
be recognised as a legal parent and therefore will not have automatic legal rights and
responsibilities towards the child. This leaves the child in a vulnerable position as the
intended parents may have limited legal powers to care for the child, for example, in
relation to medical decision-making. While this criticism could also be made about the
2014 proposals (and indeed any delayed model of  parentage), the shorter waiting period
at least reduced the period of  vulnerability. Extending the time limit so that the parental
order cannot be sought until at least six weeks after the child’s birth prolongs the child’s
precarious legal position. 
The time periods proposed under the 2017 General Scheme are the same as those that
currently apply in England and Wales under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
2008. Under this Act, the surrogate is automatically regarded as the legal mother upon the
birth of  a child. The intended parents may then apply for a parental order to transfer legal
parentage to them. Similar to the General Scheme, this order cannot be made for the first
six weeks after the child’s birth, but it must be made within six months of  the birth and
the surrogate’s consent is required for the order to be granted.29
It is arguable that the approach adopted in the current English regulation, and
mimicked in the General Scheme, disproportionately favours the surrogate at the expense
of  other stakeholders. The surrogate is effectively given a veto over the transfer of
parentage to the intended parents and has the power to change her mind about the
transfer at any time up to that point. In England and Wales, the difficulties that arise
under this approach are exemplified by recent case law such as in the recent case of  AB
(Surrogacy: Consent).30 In this case, two children born through surrogacy had been in the
care of  their intended parents (who were also the genetic parents) since the day following
their birth. The intended parents subsequently applied for a parental order to transfer
25   General Scheme of  the Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014 Head 13(5). 
26   General Scheme of  the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017, Head 47.
27   Explanatory Note accompanying ibid at p 119. 
28   The General Scheme requires the surrogate to provide her consent to the child living with the intended
parents following his or her birth: Head 46 of  the General Scheme of  the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill
2017.
29   Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s 54(7) and s 54(11).
30   AB (Surrogacy: Consent) [2016] EWHC 2643 (Fam).
parentage to them and to extinguish the surrogate’s parental status. The parental order
could not be granted, however, because the surrogate and her husband ultimately refused
to give their consent to the transfer of  parentage. This refusal was not based on any desire
on the part of  the surrogate and her husband to keep the children, nor did they raise any
concerns about the suitability of  the intended parents. Their refusal was based on ‘their
own feelings of  injustice, rather than what is in the children’s best interests’.31 Essentially,
the surrogate felt that the intended parents did not show sufficient concern for her
wellbeing whilst pregnant. 
In this case, the intended parents had met the surrogate and her husband through a
non-profit organisation. The parties underwent the recommended three month ‘getting
to know’ period and attended for mandatory implications counselling provided by the
fertility clinic before the embryo transfer took place. With the exception of  the provision
of  the consent of  the respondents, all other legislative criteria for the making of  a
parental order had been met: gestational surrogacy was used;32 both of  the intended
parents were the genetic parents of  the children;33 the applicants were married;34 they
applied for the parental order within six months of  the children’s birth;35 the children had
their home with the applicants since birth;36 the applicants domicile of  origin was
England;37 the applicants were both over 18 years;38 and they had only paid the surrogate
reasonable expenses which did not require court authorisation.39 Nonetheless, without
the consent of  the surrogate and her husband, the parental order could not be granted.
The children at the centre of  this case are now (still, it seems) left in a position where
the surrogate and her husband remain the legal parents but have no desire to play any part
in their upbringing. Meanwhile, the children are cared for by the intended parents who are
not recognised as legal parents. This is such notwithstanding an acknowledgment by the
court that ‘the children’s lifelong welfare needs require a parental order to be made’.40 In
the circumstances, the only option available to the Court was to 
. . . express the hope that [the surrogate] will be able to rediscover what led her
to undertake such a selfless role and see the situation from the view point of
these young children. From the perspective of  these children’s lifelong emotional
and psychological welfare parental orders are the only orders that accurately and
properly reflect the children’s identity as surrogate born children.41
This case highlights the disadvantages inherent in the delayed model of  parentage: it leads
to uncertainty regarding the child’s parental status and it fails to respect the reality of  the
child’s intended upbringing. This leaves the child in a vulnerable position as the intended
parents will typically care for the child from birth but may lack any automatic rights and
responsibilities in doing so. Even where the surrogacy arrangement is carried out as
intended (as most are), the delayed model of  parentage ignores the reality of  the situation.
As Gamble, notes ‘[w]here the surrogacy arrangement runs according to plan, this works
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 67(1)
31   Ibid [8].
32   Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s 54(1)(a).
33   Ibid s 54(1)(b). 
34   Ibid s 54(2)(a).
35   Ibid s 54(3). 
36   Ibid s 54(4)(a). 
37   Ibid s 54(4)(b). 
38   Ibid s 54(5). 
39   Ibid s 54(8). 
40   AB (Surrogacy: Consent) (n 30) (Fam) [11]. 
41   Ibid [32]. 
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to everyone’s detriment, leaving the parents without any parental responsibilities, the
surrogate with responsibilities she does not want, and the child in limbo for far too long’.42
It should, of  course, be noted that the Irish proposals contain a provision that would
prevent a case like AB (Surrogacy: Consent) from arising in this jurisdiction if  the proposals
are signed into law. Head 48 of  the General Scheme would allow a court to waive the
requirement for consent to be provided by the surrogate or her husband where he or she: 
a) is deceased;
b) lacks the capacity to provide consent;
c) cannot be located after reasonable efforts have been made to find him or her; or
d) for any other reason the court considers to be relevant.
The last clause would allow the court to grant the parental order in a case in which the
surrogate does not consent, and where there are exceptional reasons to do so.
Conceivably, this would apply in a case such as AB (Surrogacy: Consent) where there is
seemingly no reasonable basis for the surrogate to refuse her consent and where the best
interests of  the child require that the parental order is granted. 
Notwithstanding this subtle but significant difference between the Irish proposals and
the English approach, it is submitted that Ireland should remain wary of  the ‘delayed’ or
‘post-birth’ model of  regulation that is proposed. The delayed model of  parentage
ignores the reality of  most surrogacy arrangements. It has also led to confusion among
healthcare professionals in England and Wales, negatively affecting the provision of  care
to all stakeholders in surrogacy. Recent newspaper reports have revealed that staff  at
certain hospitals have required surrogates to hand over new-born babies to intended
parents in car parks because the hospitals feared that they would be open to liability if  the
handovers were to take place on their premises.43 In other cases, the intended parents
have not been allowed to be present for the birth of  their child.44 These reports
demonstrate that, notwithstanding an increase in the use of  surrogacy in recent years,
hospitals are still unsure how to treat intended parents because, under the delayed model
of  parentage, those intended parents have no legal relationship with the child at birth. 
It is also notable that both intended parents and surrogates have called for reform of
the English surrogacy laws in recent years. In a 2015 study published by Surrogacy UK,
for example, 70.1 per cent of  intended parents who responded indicated that the
surrogacy laws in England and Wales are in need of  reform, while 65.7 per cent of
surrogates expressed the same sentiment.45 Of  the surrogates who responded to the
survey, 64.9 per cent said that they thought that the intended parents should be the legal
parents of  a child, ‘whether genetically related or not’, while 68.5 per cent did not believe
that the surrogate should have the right to change her mind about giving the baby to the
intended parents.46
Legislation
42   Natalie Gamble, ‘Should Surrogate Mothers Still Have an Absolute Right to Change their Minds?’ Bionews (22
October 2012) <www.bionews.org.uk/page_196180.asp>.
43   Siobhan Fenton, ‘NHS Hospitals Forcing Surrogate Families to Hand over Newborn Babies in Car Parks Due
to “Dire and Outdated” Laws’ The Independent (London, 29 October 2016)
<www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/nhs-surrogate-births-rules-laws-parents-babies-handed-
over-car-parks-a7381646.html>. 
44   Ibid. 
45   Surrogacy UK, Surrogacy in the UK: Myth Busting and Reform: Report of  the Surrogacy UK Working Group on Surrogacy
Law Reform (Surrogacy UK 2015) 26. 
46   Ibid. 
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The delayed model of  parentage is increasingly regarded as out of  step with the reality
of  surrogacy. England and Wales forged new ground when it introduced its first Act of
Parliament to regulate surrogacy, the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, over 30 years
ago. This law became a prototype for the regulation of  surrogacy in countries around the
world and is still in force today (as amended by the HFEA 1990 and HFEA 2008).
However, recent developments in England and Wales, discussed above, demonstrate the
inadequacy of  the English surrogacy laws in contemporary society and suggest that such
developments should act as a caution to other countries, including Ireland, yet to
introduce legislation to regulate surrogacy.
The proposals in the Irish General Scheme suffer from the same disadvantages as the
English regulation discussed above, with the added burden of  pre-authorisation. This
requirement essentially means that the surrogacy agreement must be approved twice:
before conception by the Regulatory Authority and after birth by the courts. A much
simpler (and cheaper) process would be to allow for pre-conception court orders that
provide approval of  the surrogacy arrangement and determine the parentage of  the child
before conception takes place. This approach would allow the surrogate to give her
consent to the transfer of  parentage in advance of  the conception with the effect that the
intended parents acquire full parental responsibilities and rights at birth and the surrogate
is never recognised as a legal parent. This approach would also provide certainty, as the
parties would know who the child’s legal parents are at the outset and there would be no
need for post-birth litigation to establish who the legal parents are or indeed should be. 
Pre-conception court orders 
Pre-conception court orders allow for a child’s legal parental status to be determined prior
to conception and so the intended parents are recognised as the child’s legal parents at
birth. This approach to allocating parentage in surrogacy is adopted in a number of
countries, such as in South Africa. In that country, surrogacy agreements must be
validated by the High Court before the surrogacy is undertaken.47 Where the pre-
conception order is granted, the intended parents are recognised as the legal parents upon
the birth of  the child48 and the surrogate does not acquire any legal parental status. There
is an exception for cases of  ‘partial’ or gestational surrogacy where the surrogate is also
the genetic mother of  the child. In this case, the surrogate retains the right to terminate
the surrogate motherhood agreement by filing written notice with the court within 60
days of  the birth of  the child.49
The pre-conception order removes many of  the difficulties that can arise under the
delayed model of  parentage, as discussed above. The pre-conception order allows the
intended parents to acquire full joint parental responsibilities and rights from the moment
of  the child’s birth, which offers security and protection to the child. In the South African
case of  Ex Parte MS and Others,50 the court noted that pre-authorisation of  a surrogacy
agreement is ‘aimed largely at ensuring that there is certainty in the legal relationship
between the parties involved’. Furthermore:
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 67(1)
47   Children’s Act 2005, s 292. 
48   Ibid ss 295, 297. 
49   Ibid s 298. 
50   Ex Parte MS and Others 2014 (3) SA 415 (GP).
584
[It] advances the principle of  the best interests of  the child in that there can be
no doubt that it is in the prospective child’s best interests for his or her legal and
parental status to be settled at the earliest possible opportunity. Ideally, this
should be before there is any prospect of  conception.51
It is submitted that the element of  certainty emphasised by the Court in Ex Parte MS is
one of  the main advantages of  determining parentage prior to conception. This certainty
promotes the best interests of  the child as the intended parents have automatic rights and
responsibilities towards him or her. It also reflects the practical reality of  the situation and
the child’s intended upbringing. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the proposals contained
in the 2017 General Scheme will be amended to allow for pre-conception agreements to
be adopted to not only authorise the surrogacy arrangement in advance but to also
determine the parentage of  the child before treatment takes place. 
Conclusion
Ireland has a long-established tradition of  looking across the Irish Sea for inspiration in
legislative matters. Quite often, this approach allows the Irish legislature to produce
innovative laws that fit the needs of  contemporary society. This article has shown,
however, that the surrogacy laws of  England and Wales should not be subject to the same
treatment and should not be adopted in any future Irish legislation in this area. Recent
developments in England and Wales demonstrate that the English surrogacy laws are out
of  step with the reality of  surrogacy in that country and show that the delayed model of
parentage is not an appropriate one for Ireland to follow. In this light, it has been shown
that the model of  parentage advanced in the 2017 General Scheme would not be
appropriate and should be reconsidered by the legislature. In order to fully protect the
best interests of  children who are born through surrogacy, it is argued that an intention-
based model of  parentage, based on a system of  pre-conception agreements that allow
parentage to be determined before conception, should be introduced. 
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